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Abstract 
 
The European Union has long been seen as a distinctive or sui generis actor in international politics, 
epitomised by the notions of civilian or normative power, or more recently, by the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’. However, these conceptualisations of the EU as a distinctive international security 
provider are being challenged by the blurring of the traditional internal-external security divide. The 
threats and challenges identified in the various EU security strategies increasingly transcend 
geographic and bureaucratic boundaries, creating a European security continuum, which 
complicates the conceptualisation and operationalization of the EU as a security provider. 
Significant friction continues to exist in the formulation and implementation of security policy as EU 
institutions and capabilities struggle to overcome the traditional architecture separating internal 
and external security. In parallel the cross fertilization of internal and external security norms and 
practices undermines understandings of the EU’s role as a normative international security 
provider.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU) has long been seen as a distinctive or sui generis actor in international 
politics, epitomised by the plethora of conceptualisations of EU power, including: civilian, 
normative, transformative, post-modern, ethical, smart and soft. What many of these 
conceptualisations have in common is that the EU is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as focusing more 
on ‘milieu goals’ rather than ‘possession goals’2 with generally more (although not entirely) benign 
motivations. More recently the EU’s distinctiveness as an international security provider has been 
more pragmatically couched in the language of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, whereby the EU 
seeks to address security challenges holistically; something NATO cannot do, being primarily a 
military organisation, and other international organisations, such as the United Nations, are 
struggling with. However, these conceptualisations of the EU as a distinctive international security 
provider are being challenged by the evolving security environment. In particular, over the last 15 
years there has been a significant trend within EU security strategies towards the blurring of internal 
and external security. This increasing focus on the interconnections between internal and external 
security threats suggests the emergence of a European security continuum where geographic 
(domestic and foreign) and/or bureaucratic (civilian and military) distinctions begin to erode.  
 
This is particularly pertinent as the EU’s two overarching security policies, the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP)
3
 and the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), increasingly 
transcend the internal-external divide, with AFSJ operating inside and outside the EU and CSDP 
drawing on both civilian and military instruments. The central proposition of the article is that the 
internal-external divide is being undermined in three ways, (a) the changing nature of the threats (b) 
changing threat perceptions, and (c) the EU’s responses. However, not all security challenges blur 
these boundaries to the same degree or in the same ways: some (such as organised crime) may 
transcend geographic boundaries; some (such as state failure) may transcend bureaucratic 
boundaries; others (such as terrorism) may transcend both; while a few (such as interstate conflict) 
may transcend neither. Hence, this security continuum can act as a framework to assess the nature of 
the security threats identified by the EU and its’ responses to those threats in terms of a dual blurring 
of the geographic (domestic-foreign) and bureaucratic (civilian-military) dimensions of security. At 
                                                 
2
 Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) 
3
 CSDP was called ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 
December 2009, for the sake of consistency CSDP will be used throughout this article. 
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one end of the continuum are the transboundary
4
 challenges where geographic and bureaucratic 
divides are increasingly irrelevant. At the other end challenges are still demarcated by both 
geographic and bureaucratic division. While this trend is not new, the prominence of claims about an 
internal-external security nexus has increased significantly with implications for the EU as an 
international security provider. As Kirchner has argued: ‘the extent to which the EU can be deemed a 
security provider depends considerably on the definition of security or, more precisely, on the type of 
security threat that is envisaged.’5  
 
This emerging European security continuum creates both a practical and normative challenge for the 
EU as an international security provider. First, it creates significant challenges for the EU’s 
institutional architecture and capability profile, which are mired in bureaucratic turf wars and 
struggling to overcome the legacy of the EU’s pillar structure. Second, the EU’s responses to the 
increasing interconnections between internal and external security problematizes perceptions of the 
EU as a distinctive normative
6
 or civilian power
7
 pursuing ‘milieu goals’. These conceptualisations 
construct the EU as a security provider seeking to act as an exemplar and a ‘force for good’ in the 
international system based on promoting shared norms and values such as liberty, democracy, rule of 
law and human rights, utilising different capabilities and being driven by more benign motivations, 
which focus on goals that others, indeed all, can benefit from (milieu goals) rather than pursuing 
goals that benefit only itself (possession goals). As the security agenda widens and the EU’s 
responses tend toward protecting its own interests first, coercively if necessary, its distinctiveness 
begins to erode. Yet, the emerging security continuum also provides an opportunity for the EU to 
reframe and reassert its distinctiveness as an international security provider, through making a reality 
of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) by drawing holistically on the full spectrum of instruments at 
its disposal, while limiting the shift away from pursuing milieu goals.  
 
The guiding question the article addresses is: in what ways does the EU’s security discourse 
challenge the traditional internal-external security divide and what are the practical and normative 
implications for the EU as an international security provider? It argues that the current institutional 
                                                 
4
 See: Boin, A and Rhinard, M. (2008) ‘Managing Transboundary Crises: What role for the European Union.’ 
International Studies Review 10(1): 1-26 
5
 Kirchner, Emil, ‘The Challenge of European Union Security Governance’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, 
No. 5 (2006), p. 952  
6
 Manners, Ian ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 
2 (2002), p. 235-258   
7
 Duchêne, Francois, 'Europe's role in World Peace', in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow Sixteen European's Look 
Ahead (London: Fontana, 1972) 
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and capability framework is limiting the CA’s success, while the EU’s responses to the blurring of 
internal and external security undermine its distinctiveness as a normative international security 
provider. The article structures this analysis and argument in three parts. First, it examines the EU’s 
framing of security, with a particular focus on its discourse on the blurring of the internal-external 
divide, because the type of security threat will influence the nature of the EU as a security provider. 
This discourse is made up of the EU’s security strategies and policies, which are analysed to identify 
when, why and how the blurring of internal and external security is invoked. Second, the article 
draws out the practical implications of this discursive framing for EU security practices. In doing so 
it examines the institutional and capability opportunities and obstacles created by the emerging 
European security continuum. Finally, the article analyses the conceptual and normative 
consequences of these changing discourses and practices of security for understandings of the EU as 
an international security provider.  
 
FRAMING SECURITY: THE EU’S INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DISCOURSE 
 
Following the launch in 1999 of CSDP and AFSJ there has been a clear discursive trend across EU 
security strategies to make explicit the increasing connections between internal and external security 
and, therefore, the need to improve coordination between internal and external security institutions. 
For example, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) argued that ‘The post-Cold War 
environment is one of increasingly open borders in which internal and external aspects of security 
are indissolubly linked’8, while the 2009 Stockholm Programme went as far as claiming that ‘internal 
and external security are inseparable.’9 More specifically, the ESS, the 2008 ESS Implementation 
Report, the 2010 Internal Security Strategy (ISS) and the Commission’s ISS in Action, identify an 
ever expanding range of challenges: terrorism, cybercrime, cybersecurity, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal migration, energy security, organised crime, state 
failure, environmental change, regional conflict, natural and man-made disasters and border security. 
As the number and complexity of security challenges increased, so did references to the increasing 
linkages between internal and external security. As Catherine Ashton, the former High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), argued: ‘we know that 
internal and external challenges are interconnected. Take illegal immigration or terrorism. Neither is 
                                                 
8
 Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 12 December 2003), p. 2 
9
 Council of the EU, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens 
(Brussels, 2 December 2009), p.73 
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purely an internal or external issue.’10 Yet, this discursive construction of an emerging security 
continuum is barely reflected in the implementation of the ESS or ISS. 
 
This is partly because the ESS and ISS, while providing overarching frameworks within which the 
EU and its member states identify common security threats and challenges, are two quite distinct 
strategies.
11
 First, they were drafted very differently. The ESS was quickly drawn up within the 
office of Javier Solana, then High Representative for CFSP. The ISS had a much longer gestation 
period, being promoted by the Commission, Council and EU Presidencies over several years before 
being adopted under the Spanish Presidency in February 2010. Second, the strategies differ in their 
recommendations for action. The ESS and its 2008 Implementation Report are quite vague in their 
policy proposals. The ISS and, in particular, the Commission’s ISS in Action make much more 
specific recommendations for tackling the challenges identified. Third, the strategies had different 
rationales. The ESS was about rebuilding commonality on international security issues in the wake 
of the 2003 Iraq war, while the ISS was about improving coordination, policy and action through the 
development of a ‘European security model’. 
 
Yet despite these differences, the ESS and ISS display some strikingly similar characteristics. Two 
are particularly relevant to the emerging European security continuum: (a) claims that internal and 
external security are inseparable; and (b) the threats identified. First, both strategies explicitly claim 
that the internal-external divide is eroding. The ESS argues we live in a world of ‘increasingly open 
borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’12, emphasising 
the geographic blurring of security challenges. The strategy continues, ‘none of the new threats is 
purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’,13 suggesting the bureaucratic 
distinction between military and civilian security is becoming less clear cut. The dual blurring 
discourse is continued in the 2008 ESS Implementation Report, which emphasises the EU’s desire to 
‘improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions’ of security.14 
Specifically, it calls for the ‘coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, 
development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade cooperation, and civilian and 
                                                 
10
 Council of the EU, Remarks by HR Catherine Ashton at Munich Security Conference (Brussels, 6 February 2010) 
11
 There is a long standing debate as to whether the ESS is actually a strategy. For example see: Toje, Asle ‘The 2003 
European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol 10, No. 1, (2005)  pp. 
117-133 Biscop, Sven & Andersson, Joel (eds.), The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe 
(London: Routledge, 2007) 
12
 Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better, op. cit., p. 1 
13
 Ibid., p. 7 
14
 Council of the EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a 
Changing World (Brussels, 11 December, 2008), p. 4 
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military crisis management.’15 However, these calls refer primarily to EU policies and missions 
overseas, not yet signifying bureaucratic linkages with the EU’s internal security structures. 
 
Nevertheless, the ISS discourse explicitly makes a case for ‘a greater interdependence between 
internal and external security’ stressing that internal security ‘must be understood as a wide and 
comprehensive concept which straddles multiple sectors.’16 The ISS devotes an entire section to the 
external dimension of internal security, claiming ‘a concept of internal security cannot exist without 
an external dimension, since internal security increasingly depends to a large extent on external 
security,’17 signifying a geographic merging of security. The strategy, therefore, calls for greater 
cooperation between Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and CSDP through the ‘participation of law 
enforcement agencies and Justice Freedom and security bodies at all stages of civil crisis 
management,’18 suggesting a bureaucratic blurring of security. This discursive framing is 
consolidated in the Commission’s ISS in Action, which clearly argues for a dual blurring of security 
claiming that ‘many of today’s security challenges are cross-border and cross-sectoral in nature.’19 It 
continues, ‘in striving to reach our security objectives, the contribution from both EU internal and 
external policies is crucial.’20 To do so, it is ‘important to ensure coherence and complementarity 
between internal and external aspects of EU security.’21 The ISS also identifies institutions 
associated with external security as crucial to tackling some key internal challenges. For example, to 
implement the ISS the Commission calls for the European External Action Service (EEAS) to ‘be 
invited to participate to ensure consistency with the wider European Security Strategy and to exploit 
synergies between internal and external policies, including risk and threat assessments.’22 The 
Commission’s communication also calls for the linking of the different situation awareness centres 
across the EU to better coordinate responses to crises and disasters, and the use of maritime 
surveillance capabilities to enhance border management. However, as with the ESS and as explored 
later, these calls for enhanced linkages between the EU’s internal and external security institutions 
remain largely rhetorical, with little progress in bringing together internal and external security 
institutions more systematically. Nevertheless, the ESS and ISS demonstrate how the EU is 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., p. 9 
16
 Council of the EU, Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: “Towards a European Security Model” 
(Brussels, 8 March 2010) p. 2, 5 
17
 Council of the EU, Draft Internal Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 16-17 
18
 Ibid., p. 17 
19
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. The EU 
Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a more secure Europe (Brussels, 22 November 2010), p. 2 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., p. 3 
22
 Ibid., p. 15 
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discursively constructing a European security continuum through a dual (geographic and 
bureaucratic) blurring of security. This blurring may lead to the cross fertilisation of internal and 
external security norms and practices, which may undermine the EU’s normative security provider 
self-image. 
 
This blurring is supported by the second striking commonality of these two security strategies; 
overlapping threats and challenges, despite the strategies’ different orientations. The ESS is 
externally orientated, seeking to identify the threats and challenges within the international system 
which are likely to affect the security of the EU, its member states, and its citizens. Meanwhile the 
ISS is directed at the challenges to citizen’s security originating from within the EU. Yet a number of 
security challenges appear in both strategies, including: terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime, 
arms trafficking, cybercrime and cybersecurity, energy security, neighbourhood and border security, 
and resilience to accidents and disasters whether natural or man-made. While the ISS and 
Commission’s communication may emphasise different aspects of a particular security threat than 
the ESS, they are identifying similar issues. This overlap suggests, as the Chairman of the UK’s 
Serious Organised Crime Agency argued, that ‘there is a seamless relationship between an internal 
security strategy and an external one.’23  
 
Turning briefly to the EU’s framing of some specific security challenges it is clear that the internal-
external divide is being eroded. In both the ESS and ISS terrorism is a clear example of a security 
threat that transcends the internal-external divide. The 2005 Counter Terrorism Strategy argues the 
EU ‘is an area of increasing openness, in which the internal and external aspects of security are 
intimately linked…This is an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives.’24 
Managing regional conflict, while usually seen as a foreign policy issue, requires a range of 
capabilities beyond the diplomats and military, including: rule of law, civil protection, administrative 
expertise, aid, trade, and development policy. In this vein the ISS transcends the internal-external 
divide when it calls for greater cooperation between external (CSDP) and internal (JHA) bodies.  
Transcending the divide in the opposite direction CSDP’s crisis management missions and the 
prevention of, or response to, state failure are integral to ameliorating internal security threats, such 
as illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism. Indeed, the increasingly transnational nature 
of organised crime creates a dual blurring of internal and external security. The ESS argues ‘the 
                                                 
23
 Andrews, Ian, in European Union Committee - Seventeenth Report: The EU Internal Security Strategy (May 2011) 
para. 43  
24
 Council of the EU, The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy (Brussels, 30 November 2005), p. 6 
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internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross border trafficking in drugs, 
women, illegal immigrants, and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal 
gangs.’25 Furthermore, in 2011 the JHA Council called for COSI (Standing Committee on Internal 
Security) ‘to ensure that these crime priorities are taken into account in other policy areas, 
particularly in the Unions’ external action.’26 In order to combat the cross-border trafficking of 
drugs, people, weapons and counterfeit merchandise, internal security policies and agencies have 
been externalised and external security missions have developed more traditional internal security 
(policing) features. For example Europol, which was originally established to tackle drug trafficking 
in Europe, adopted an external strategy in 2004 and quickly widened its remit to other forms of 
international (primarily organised) crime.
27
 A move in the opposite direction is the use of CSDP 
missions to tackle organised crime, originally in the Balkans and more recently in the Sahel and with 
EUNAVFOR off the coast of Somalia. While EUNAVFOR is a military mission outside the territory 
of the EU its primary role is to ‘fight piracy and armed robbery’, in other words organised crime. 
This is explicitly stated in the ESS Implementation Report, which ‘highlighted piracy as a new 
dimension of organised crime.’28 The EU’s efforts to tackle organised crime illustrate it is an internal 
and external security challenge, that traditional geographic and bureaucratic distinctions are 
increasingly problematic, and the capabilities being used affect the nature of the EU as a security 
provider.  Finally, following the 2008 ESS Report cybersecurity is now a prominent challenge for 
both internal and external security strategies. The EU’s 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy makes clear 
reference to the dual blurring of internal and external security. The geographic blurring is apparent in 
the strategy’s argument that ‘the global reach of the Internet means that law enforcement must adopt 
a coordinated and collaborative cross-border approach’, while bureaucratic blurring is evident in the 
strategy’s desire that ‘synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting cyber assets 
should be enhanced.’29 This framing of security as blurring the internal-external divide, as an 
emerging security continuum, may undermine the EU’s more normative approach through possible 
recourse to military capabilities. Yet it also provides an opportunity for the EU to rearticulate its 
                                                 
25
 Council of the EU, A Secure Europe in a Better, op. cit., p. 4 
26
 Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on setting the EU’s priorities for the fight against organised crime between 
2011 and 2013, (Brussels, 10 June 2011) 
27
 Mounier, Gregory, ‘Civilian Crisis Management and the External Dimension of JHA: Inceptive, Functional and 
Institutional Similarities’, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2009), pp. 45-64 
28
 Council of the EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, op. cit., p. 8 
29
 European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace 
(Brussels, 7 February 2013) 
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distinctiveness as comprehensive international security provider. However, to successfully do so 
requires significant adjustments to the practice of EU security. 
 
PRACTICING EU SECURITY  
 
Institutions: Breaking Down Chinese Walls? 
 
The institutional divide between internal and external security in the EU is rooted in the 1992 Treaty 
on European Union, which established separate pillars for JHA (internal security) and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP - external security). This structure was inevitable as it reflected 
the member states reluctance to cede sovereignty in security and allowed for intergovernmental 
decision-making. The separation of JHA and CFSP also mirrored the European state model, which 
sought to ensure there was a differentiation between the state’s monopoly on the use of violence 
internally (within its borders) and externally (outside of its borders). This led to discrete institutions 
being responsible for domestic security (the police, judiciary and customs) and foreign security 
(primarily diplomats and the military) with very different legal bases and contrasting approaches to 
the use of force.  
 
Under the separate pillars of JHA/AFSJ and CSFP/CSDP a profusion of councils, committees, 
coordinators and working groups responsible for security issues were established in the Council, 
Commission and, since 2010, the EEAS. The difficulty has been to coordinate the work of these 
bodies and develop coherent policies and actions while respecting the distinct competences of each 
pillar. It is commonly accepted that communication, let alone coordination, between the 
Commission, Council or EEAS (inter-institutional), and even within DGs or departments (intra-
institutional), is problematic.
30
 Instead what often occurs are turf wars as competing bodies try to 
ensure their primacy in overlapping policy areas. This means that, institutionally, the EU, like its 
member states, still has a rather compartmentalised approach to security policy despite the rhetoric 
on the blurring of internal and external security. 
 
Nevertheless, the launch in 1999 of the AFSJ and CSDP, while separate, sowed the seeds for the dual 
blurring of internal and external security institutions. In particular, the externalisation of AFSJ since 
                                                 
30
 Christiansen, T., ‘Intra-Institutional politics and inter-institutional relations in the EU: towards coherent governance?’ 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3, (2001), pp. 747-769 
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the 1999 Tampere Programme’s call for JHA to be able to develop ‘stronger external action’31 has 
moved rapidly to tackle security challenges beyond the EU’s borders.32 Within CSDP the use of both 
civilian and military capabilities for crisis management means the bureaucratic divide between 
internal and external security is less clear cut. As CSDP missions tackle challenges such as terrorism 
and organised crime the emerging security continuum becomes more apparent; a trend continued 
under the Lisbon Treaty (LT). 
 
The LT contained a number of reforms designed to enhance consistency and coherence across EU 
security policy, in theory strengthening the EU as an international security provider. First, the LT 
gave the EU, not just the EC, a legal personality. This provided the EU with ‘authority’, in principle, 
to sign agreement and treaties with third parties across all policy areas, including security. This, 
however, does not resolve arguments over who within the EU has legal competence for particular 
security issues. In the past such disputes have been taken to the European Court of Justice; such as 
the 2004 case between the European Parliament and the Commission over the Passenger Name 
Record legislation, and the 2005 case between the Council of the EU and the Commission over 
tackling small arms proliferation in West Africa. With the blurring of internal and external security 
these types of disputes are likely to increase. Hence, while some international security agreements 
have been signed, without resolving inter-institutional competition, a single legal personality will not 
dramatically enhance the EU’s security provider role. 
 
Second, the LT reformed the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy structures. The LT formally 
ended the EU’s pillar structure (while retaining different decision-making structures), created a High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) (who was also 
Commission Vice-President (VP) for External Affairs), and established the EEAS headed by the 
HR/VP. The EEAS brought together personnel from the Council, the Commission External Relations 
DG and member states with the explicit objective of enhancing the EU as an international security 
provider. The HR and EEAS seek to do this through improving cooperation, coordination, 
consistency and coherence both between member states and EU security policies and between 
different EU institutions. However, it is the latter that has been the principal focus, with the HR 
‘dual-hatted’ so that s/he is responsible both for CFSP/CSDP and External Relations in the 
Commission.  
                                                 
31
 European Council, Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council (Brussels: 16 October 1999) 
32
 Monar, Jorg, The  External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Progress, potential and 
limitations after the Treaty of Lisbon (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2012) 
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Yet, the dual hatting of the HR/VP has not brought greater coherence or consensus on 
understandings of security between, or even within, the Commission and the EEAS. This creates 
problems for intra- and inter-institutional cooperation on issues such as the terrorism, energy, 
organised crime and immigration. These issues are primarily the responsibility of the Commission 
and there are continuing tensions between those DGs and the EEAS, highlighted during the 
negotiations establishing the EEAS when several functions of the External Relations DG were 
moved to other Commission DGs to avoid them being integrated into the EEAS.
33
 These fears 
continue to affect coordination across these security issues. In effect, institutions and departments are 
often still functioning on a pre-Lisbon basis; with the abolition of the pillar structure more symbolic 
than practical. Personalities, politics, budgets and bureaucratic inertia all contribute to the 
perpetuation of an invisible pillar structure. The divisions are encapsulated by turf wars between and 
within the EEAS, Commission and Council, and by mutual wariness between civilian and military 
personnel. Hence, despite some institutional changes, much more is needed to make a reality of the 
CA and avoid institutional disjointedness undermining the EU’s ‘capacity to act’34 as an international 
security provider.  
 
Nevertheless, the EEAS has potential to enhance the EU’s ability to address the blurring of internal 
and external security and rearticulate its distinctiveness as a security provider. This was evident in 
the Commission’s ISS in Action, which invited the EEAS to ‘exploit synergies between internal and 
external policies’ and argued that ‘COSI…and the Political and Security Committee [PSC] should 
work together and meet regularly.’35 This was followed in 2011 by the Hungarian Presidency calling 
for the ‘tightening of links between external and internal aspects of EU security’, including sharing 
intelligence, incorporating internal security actors in the planning of CSDP missions, integrating 
threat assessments, training, implementing the solidarity clause and in communicating on EU 
security with third parties.
36
 Steps in this direction were taken in June that year with the launch of a 
‘working method for closer cooperation and coordination in the field of EU security’, which focused 
on two key proposals. First, quarterly inter-institutional meetings between the EEAS, Council and 
Commission, where representatives from the PSC, COSI, relevant Council and Commission 
directorates (e.g. justice, home affairs) and other bodies would exchange information; however, the 
                                                 
33
 Author’s interviews with EU officials (Brussels, October & December 2013) 
34
 Rhodes, Carolyn, (ed.), The European Union in the world community, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998) 
35
 European Commission, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, op. cit., p. 15 
36
 Council of the EU, Tightening the Links between External and Internal aspects of Security (Brussels, 4 February 2011) 
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meeting would have no decision-making powers.
37
 Second, the plan advocated joint meetings of 
preparatory bodies within the Council such as a PSC-COSI meeting, but also possibly: the 
Committee for Civilian aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the COSI support group, Civil 
Protection and External JHA councillors (JAIEX), the Council working group on terrorism (COTER) 
and the Terrorism Working Group (TWG) with the counter terrorism coordinator also participating, 
and JAIEX meeting with geographical preparatory bodies.
38
 However, despite institutional linkages 
being created, these meetings have seldom led to any substantive progress in enhancing the EU’s 
capacity to tackle the blurring of internal and external security.
39
 
 
In the longer term, however, bringing together COSI and the PSC, as well as the establishment of the 
multi-institutional, cross-sectoral Crisis Platform, could lay the foundations for overcoming the 
‘institutional fragmentation’40 so strongly evident across EU security policymaking. The Crisis 
Platform, convened by the EEAS, can bring together a range of civilian and military bodies from 
across the EEAS and, importantly, Commission DGs. While designed to address specific external 
conflicts or disasters its role in developing the EU’s mission in Mali, including a counter-terrorism 
element, illustrates its potential as a forum for bridging the divide between those institutions tackling 
internal and external security.
 41
 Allowing the bodies responsible for internal and external security to 
coordinate better would help the EU add to, rather than duplicate, member states capacities. This is 
important for enhancing the EU’s legitimacy as an international security provider among its member 
states and EU citizens.  Yet, bringing these bodies closer together also risks raising further serious 
political sensitivities about accountability, securitisation, and further turf wars. However, if handled 
judiciously, with appropriate accountability and focused on practical measures, then adjusting 
institutional structures to address the emerging European security continuum has the potential to 
enhance the EU’s distinctive role as an international security provider. To do would also need greater 
coordination of EU capabilities, in particular between its civilian and military instruments. 
 
Coordinating Civil-Military Capabilities: Towards a Comprehensive Approach? 
 
                                                 
37
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Like its institutional architecture the security capability profile of the EU has struggled to adapt to 
the emerging security continuum. Coordination needs to be improved in three areas to enhance the 
EU’s ability to contribute to international security. First, the tools available through the Commission 
(such as aid, development, conflict prevention and civil protection) need to be better coordinated 
with the tools available under the CFSP and CSDP. Second, both the Commission and the EEAS 
could draw more systematically on the instruments and expertise available through JHA, covering 
police and judicial cooperation. Third, the divisions between civilian and military capabilities also 
need to be bridged, both within CFSP/CSDP and between CFSP/CSDP and other policy areas.  
 
The traditional understanding of internal and external security capabilities is based on the European 
state model. This ensured that threats to security from within the borders were tackled by civilian 
policing and threats to security from outside the borders were managed by the military. While, this 
distinction was never clear cut, EU security strategies suggest this divide is blurring at the EU level. 
For example, the Solidarity Clause explicitly calls for the use of military capabilities, if necessary, in 
preventing and responding to terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters within and outside 
the EU.
42
 This gradual blurring has been coupled with a slow but definite transformation of the role 
of the security services, police, intelligence bodies and armed forces within states.
43
 The way CSDP 
has developed illustrates this transformation and how internal-external distinctions are becoming 
increasingly cumbersome. Already in 2002 the need to bring together CSDP’s civilian (mostly 
internal) and military (usually external) capabilities was highlighted in a report submitted to the 
European Convention by the Working Group on Defence. The report suggested the development of a 
pool of civilian and military civil protection capabilities, which would need to exercise together 
regularly to improve effectiveness when deployed.
44
 While little came out of this report directly, 
CSDP has, with varying success, drawn on an expanding range of capabilities from judicial 
personnel and civilian police, through to strategic airlift and combat troops. However, fully fledged 
civil-military coordination has remained quite elusive with the CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa 
being a rare example of relative success. 
 
CSDP operations themselves have further problematized the distinction of the military being used 
externally and the police internally. In certain extreme circumstances it has always been possible for 
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the military (under civilian control) to undertake internal roles. However, this was the exception and 
developments such as the Solidarity Clause and references to increasing the EU’s ‘resilience to crises 
and disasters’45 suggests a move towards normalising such exceptions. In parallel, EU internal 
security capabilities are increasingly operating externally in tackling terrorism and organised crime 
(e.g. EUCAP Sahel) or in post conflict stabilisation and border management operations (e.g. 
EUBAM Libya). While the military prefer for police and other agencies to be deployed alongside 
them, rather than, as happened previously, having to undertake policing roles themselves, this is not 
always possible. As well as the military performing policing functions there continue to be 
difficulties in deploying civilian police into volatile post-conflict environments. This blurring of 
roles suits neither police nor military personnel,
46
 contributing to the increasing use of gendarmerie 
capabilities. At the European level the agreement on a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) in 2004 
may act as a useful transitional capability between civilian and military capabilities. The 800 strong 
EGF, which became operational in July 2006, is made up of contributions from six EU states 
(France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain) and is deployable alongside civilian 
police, the military, or both. While not an EU capability as such, it will be ‘first and foremost at the 
disposal of the EU’ and would in such circumstances be under the political and strategic control of 
the PSC.
47
 As internal and external security agendas converge gendarmerie forces are of growing 
importance,
48
 as demonstrated by EGF’s deployment within the EU’s Operation Althea in Bosnia 
between November 2007 and October 2010, as well as its role in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan 
since 2009, and its contribution to the UN mission in Haiti in 2010. 
 
A significant move to better coordinate civilian and military capabilities came in late 2008 when the 
European Council called on the HR to ‘establish a new, single civilian-military strategic planning 
structure for ESDP operations.’49 This new structure, known as the Crisis Management and Planning 
Directorate (CMPD), was designed to merge the strategic planning functions of DG E VIII (military 
crisis management) and DGE IX (civilian crisis management) as well as incorporating elements of 
the EU Military Staff’s (EUMS) CivMil Cell.50 The CMPD was a belated response to the EU’s long 
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standing claim that ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely 
military means’51 and its commitment ‘to strengthening synergies between its civilian and military 
crisis management instruments.’52 It is also (at least on paper) another step towards 
comprehensiveness in EU security provision. However, as Manners argues, the introduction, indeed 
prioritisation, of military capabilities risks undermining the EU’s normative power53 and therefore 
diminishing its distinctiveness as a security provider. 
 
Given the CA’s focus on external security it is unsurprising that efforts to improve the coordination 
of capabilities have been mostly within the EEAS and CSDP. Yet, in the longer term synergies in 
capabilities across institutions and policy areas are crucial. The EU already accepts that it must 
enhance its capacity to act externally in order to protect internal security.
54
 As Rees has argued, it is 
time the EU realises that the inflexible separation of instruments for foreign policy and internal 
security is no longer appropriate as transnational challenges defy such distinctions.
55
 Such an 
acknowledgement would enhance the EU’s claims to being an international security provider by 
strengthening ‘the availability of, and a capacity to utilize, policy instruments.’56 The EU has, in 
principle, available to it the full range of instruments expected of an international security provider, 
from aid to diplomacy and from economic sanctions to military force. In fact it may be uniquely 
placed in this regard, thus providing the opportunity to enhance its distinctiveness. Through 
improving the coordination between capabilities, especially civil-military, it will move closer to 
fulfilling its ambition to be a distinctive international security provider capable of tackling the 
complexities of the emerging European security continuum.  
 
PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY? 
 
The emerging European security continuum has been partly driven by changes in the nature of 
threats. However, it has also been significantly driven by changes in threat perception, by the EU’s 
security discourse, and its efforts to adapt its institutions and capabilities. Hence, the politics and 
practice of providing security are as important in shaping the security continuum as the actual 
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threats. Politics and practice also influence the prospects for nature of the EU as an international 
security provider.  
 
The first section of the article argued that the blurring of internal and external security in the EU’s 
security discourse provides an opportunity to rearticulate its distinctiveness as an international 
security provider. The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy illustrates the EU’s potential to provide a 
comprehensive approach to security, combining internal and external challenges, institutions and 
capabilities. This strategy drew from departments across the EEAS (Global Affairs, Directorate K 
(security policy) and the EUMS) and Commission (DG HOME and DG CNECT), spanning the 
challenges of cybercrime, cybersecurity and cyber-defence. However, negotiating such a 
comprehensive strategy was complicated by significant institutional differences, to the extent that the 
strategy almost became a solely CFSP communication.
57
 This would have undermined the 
comprehensiveness, distinctiveness, and added value the EU could bring to tackling this security 
challenge.  It would have also failed to understand the multifaceted and intertwined nature of cyber 
security/crime/defence, which transcends the internal-external divide both geographically and 
bureaucratically. Similarly, the development of the EU Maritime Security Strategy involved internal 
and external, civilian and military bodies from the EEAS (EUMS, Directorate K, and CMPD) and 
Commission (DG MARE and DG MOVE). Another example of the potential of the EU to bring 
together internal and external security actors is the aforementioned Crisis Platform, which has 
generally been seen to have been beneficial in, at the very least, bringing the relevant institutions, 
directorates and units together.
58
 If only to exchange information this already improves coordination 
and is the first step towards a comprehensive approach to security. These strategies and 
developments, and the institutional frictions they overcame, illustrate that the CA might be securing 
a foothold within the EU’s nascent security culture, thereby enhancing the EU’s distinctiveness as a 
multifaceted international security provider.  
 
Finally, the 2013 Joint Communication from the EEAS and Commission on the Comprehensive 
Approach provides an opportunity to better address the emerging security continuum. While it 
focuses on ‘external conflict and crises’ it does so as a way of mitigating ‘the negative effects – for 
the EU, its citizens and its internal security – of insecurity and conflict elsewhere.’59 The 
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communication has an entire section devoted to ‘linking policies and internal and external action’, 
which highlights that ‘EU internal policies and actions can have significant external 
effects…likewise, external action and policy can also impact on EU internal dynamics.’60 In the 
longer term it might be worth considering a comprehensive approach that brings together internal 
and external security. Such an approach would be beneficial for two reasons. First, the nature of the 
threats and challenges identified by the EU are increasingly transboundary; occurring inside and 
outside the EU and requiring a range of different institutions and capabilities to tackle them. Second, 
such a comprehensive approach would provide a platform for overcoming the EU’s institutional 
stove-piping, bureaucratic turf wars, and divergent security cultures. There are significant difficulties 
and dangers in trying to develop such an all-encompassing approach, but not doing so might be 
problematic given the emerging security continuum. It would also be a missed opportunity to 
rearticulate the EU’s distinctiveness as a security provider. 
 
Despite the opportunities presented by the emerging security continuum, as the second section of the 
article outlined, inter- and intra-institutional turf wars are a major practical obstacle limiting the 
potential of the EU to fulfil its potential as distinctive international security provider.  In addition to 
the practical obstacles discussed above, a number of normative and conceptual problems may also 
inhibit the EU. First, despite the Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach, different 
understandings of what the CA actually implies persist. Even within institutions, such as the EEAS, 
there are differences about how the CA should be pursued, what the best institutional arrangements 
are, and what capabilities are best suited to particular security challenges.
61
 Within these discussions, 
the availability, role, and use of military instruments within the CA are particularly contentious. The 
key is to be able to select and coordinate the most appropriate tools for a particular security 
challenge, whether they are from within the EEAS, the Commission or both. For example, the 
proliferation of WMD is an important issue for CFSP,
62
 but the Commission through its TACIS 
programme in the Former Soviet Union has also pursued non-proliferation. Yet, even after the LT 
and the Joint Communication on the CA, these two approaches, while nominally linked through the 
HR/VP, are still not particularly well coordinated. 
 
The second conceptual challenge is the different understandings of security across the EU. Without a 
reasonably common definition of security it is difficult, Kirchner argues, to assess whether the EU 
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can be a security provider.
63
 While EU security strategies overlap in their threat assessments there 
remain differences over priorities, approaches, and even whether some challenges are (or should) be 
considered and addressed as security issues. There is a longstanding debate, within academia and the 
EU, about the advantages and dangers of ‘securitising' policy issues.64 In the EU this is related to turf 
wars over which institution has responsibility for which issue and, therefore, over how it is framed. 
This can be seen in the Commission’s securitisation rhetoric and technologies in policy areas such as 
immigration, organised crime and border control. Yet other branches of the Commission, such as DG 
ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), fiercely resist securitisation. DG ECHO is adamant humanitarian aid 
should be neutral, impartial, and independent focusing on humanitarian need.
65
 For DG ECHO 
security is framed as human security. Hence, it is important not to be seen as part of the actions of 
the EEAS or other parts of the Commission, while recognising ECHO’s role and contributing to the 
CA. It does so through the mantra of “in but out”, whereby they aim to be part of the “overall effect” 
through coordination and collaboration but ensure the principles of neutrality and the humanitarian 
needs based approach remain.
66
 This effort to ensure neutrality, and, crucially the perception of 
neutrality, has been complicated by the introduction of an EEAS Crisis Response department, with a 
responsibility for the overall planning, organisation and coordination of crisis related activities. This 
overlaps with both the civil protection and humanitarian aid remit of ECHO, creating significant 
institutional friction and potentially undermining the distinctiveness of EU security provision.  
 
This friction is exacerbated by the EEAS Situation Room replicating some of the functions of DG 
ECHO’s Emergency Response Centre (ERC) and was heightened further by the suggestion in the 
2013 EEAS Review that the Situation Room should be co-located with the ERC.
67
 Creating a single 
24/7 ERC has the potential to streamline capabilities, reduce duplication (and therefore costs) and, in 
the spirit of the CA, bring increased coordination. However, it would also be seen as infringing on 
the impartiality and neutrality of DG ECHO as it would potentially put military personnel (or at least 
personnel with a defence remit) inside the Commission (those ‘Watchkeeper’ staff which were in the 
EUMS and are now co-located in the Situation Room). This raises concerns about the securitisation 
and militarisation of crises, while also antagonising the EUMS who highly value the Watchkeeper 
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capability.
68
 More practically, it raises difficulties in terms of the size of the facility and its lack of 
secure communications. Finally, such a move would not enhance coordination with DG HOME’s 
crisis room, which focuses on internal security. While the institutional battles could, eventually, be 
worked through, the fundamental differences in understandings of security will be harder to 
overcome. It would move the EU away from the human security approach, thereby affecting the 
distinctive nature of the EU as an international security provider. 
 
Differing conceptions of security would also come to the fore if, as the EEAS Review calls for, the 
EEAS was to ‘reinforce its capacity’ to deal with issues such as energy security, environmental 
protection and climate change, migration, and counter terrorism. These policy areas are primarily the 
responsibility of the Commission and there are heated debates (even within the EEAS) over the value 
of enhancing the EEAS’ capacity to address these issues.69 Instead, as the Commission has the 
expertise and resourcing, the focus should be on improving communication, cooperation and 
coordination between the EEAS and the Commission; something the dual hatting of the HR/VP did 
not really facilitate under the first HR/VP Catherine Ashton.
70
 Initial signs are that the new HR/VP, 
Federica Mogherini, is seeking to prioritise enhancing the EEAS-Commission relationship. In 
particular, including the former Director General of the Commission’s DG HOME, Stafano 
Manservisi, as her Chef de Cabinet may facilitate greater coordination between internal and external 
security.
71
 
 
More fundamentally, moving these policy areas, if only in part, into the EEAS has the potential to 
reshape the normative basis of the EU as an international security provider. With immigration policy 
heavily securitised, the EU is often perceived as being less interested in the plight of the migrants 
(milieu goals or human security) than the domestic politics of it member states (strategic interests or 
possession goals). With the migration crisis in the Mediterranean escalating and Frontex’s Triton 
mission off the coast of Italy being criticised for its small size and focus on border control rather than 
search and rescue, the pressures on the normative approach of the EU are intensifying. Operation 
Triton seems to reinforce the image of fortress Europe with navy and air force assets seen to be 
protecting the interests of EU security rather than acting in the interests of human security. This 
undermines the EU’s desire to be seen as a distinctive normative security provider acting as a ‘force 
for good’ on the international stage. 
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The emerging European security continuum, while opening up opportunities for the EU to assert 
itself as a security provider, is likely to reshape these normative conceptualisations. If an internal-
external security nexus exists then a seemingly logical response is to ensure greater cooperation, 
coordination and even integration of the EU’s internal and external institutions and capabilities. 
However, the consequences of such developments have drawn criticism from a number of scholars, 
such as Dider Bigo.
72
 The central concern relates to the issue of the securitisation and even 
militarisation of policies that should remain in the realm of ‘normal politics’ and can lead to 
‘exceptional’ security measures becoming the norm.73 It is not just the EU discourse that securitises 
policy areas, the EU’s security instruments and technologies are, as Balzacq argues, at least as 
important.
74
 These developments challenge the perception of the EU as a distinctive security 
provider with more (although not entirely) benign motivations. It is difficult to make a case for the 
EU as distinctive civilian, normative or ethical power while its approaches to managing immigration 
are interpreted as reinforcing notions of ‘fortress Europe’ and its counter-terrorism policies are 
criticised for emphasising security over justice and liberty.  
 
Similarly, having access to a range of coercive instruments (not just military) may undermine notions 
of the EU as a normative power, focused on human security.
75
 While there are debates about means 
and ends, the overall perception (from within and outside of the EU) is that as the EU engages with 
an expanding array of security issues, utilising an increasingly interconnected range of instruments, 
its distinctiveness as a normative power (if it is) is in danger of being undermined. A number of 
scholars, such as Karen Smith and Ian Manners, raise concerns that developing a military capability 
negates the EU’s claims to being a civilian or normative power.76 While it is difficult to argue that 
CSDP has militarised the EU, securitisation has occurred, but driven more by the Commission’s 
internal security agenda than the EEAS’s external agenda. This is supported in other policy areas by 
scholars, such as Hette and Soderbaum, who suggested that the EU is moving towards a ‘soft 
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imperialism’ through the more coercive use of conditionality in its enlargement and neighbourhood 
strategies, undermining its civilian and normative power claims,
77
 and, therefore, its distinctiveness. 
Similarly, as the EU identifies and engages with this emerging security continuum, the interchanging 
use of civilian, gendarmerie and military capabilities to tackle issues such as organised crime, 
immigration, civil protection and terrorism risks the perception of the EU shifting away from its 
more benign, civilian or normative characteristics.   
 
A final possible implication of the eroding internal-external security divide is that calls for greater 
coordination and even integration of committees, working groups and institutions, raise significant 
questions about oversight, accountability, legitimacy and transparency. In particular it becomes 
increasingly problematic to maintain oversight and clear lines of accountability as the formal and 
informal networks of agencies, institutions, experts and working groups expand. For example, 
Europol, an EU agency, explicitly operates as a network structure,
78
 both within the EU (Frontex), 
but also increasingly with third countries (the USA) and organisations (the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime). In addition, the numerous agencies providing information to Europol have their own 
networks so tracing the origins of information or keeping track of who uses the data Europol collates, 
and how, becomes very difficult. These developments, often leading to a more opaque network of 
security actors, can undermine perceptions about the legitimacy of EU as an international security 
provider.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has argued that the EU’s discourse on the blurring of internal and external security is a 
significant factor shaping the potential for, and understandings of, the EU as an international security 
provider. Its importance is not just for the EU’s institutional architecture and capability profile, but 
also for its enduring ambition to be a distinctive (normative) international security provider. Being 
distinct is important for the EU in at least two ways. First, institutional distinctiveness is, according 
to Jupille and Caporaso, crucial for, ‘autonomy.’79 Distinctiveness is essential in differentiating the 
EU from other potential security providers such as the UN, NATO, AU, or OSCE, as well as from 
the so called great and rising powers, such as the US, China, Russia, India, Brazil, and South Africa. 
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With an emerging security continuum the potential for the EU to draw on a wide range of 
capabilities through the CA, could be the basis for a rearticulated (practical) distinctiveness as an 
international security provider. Few other international organisations have the potential of the EU for 
a genuinely comprehensive approach to the challenges of international security. Despite the 
obstacles, its faults and its mistakes, the EU is still, in parts of the world, the preferred or only 
security provider that is willing to become involved. 
 
Second, distinctiveness is important normatively. The EU has long identified itself as a civilian or 
normative power, especially in its contributions to international security. For example Bailes has 
argued that CSDP could be described as ‘do-gooding’,80 running missions for the benefit of others 
rather than itself. However, increasingly CSDP missions, such as capacity building to tackle 
organised crime and terrorism in the Sahel, anti-piracy in the Indian Ocean or border assistance in 
Moldova and Libya, are clearly defined in terms of EU strategic and security interests. This has 
implications for the EU’s normative or ‘force for good’ rationale, placing, as Merlingen argues, 
strategic interests above normative ones.
81
  Pursuing EU interests and normative distinctiveness are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. The missions mentioned above are also in the interests of the 
states, regions and populations within which they operate. However, the perception created both 
within and outside of the EU, is of interests trumping normative aspirations. This pushes the EU in a 
direction that undermines its self-identification as a distinctive international security provider, more 
influenced by normative milieu goals than possession goals. 
 
To conclude, the emerging European security continuum impacts on the EU as an international 
security provider in three ways. First, it provides opportunity. The EU’s range of instruments (at least 
on paper) gives it the potential for much greater agency and for rearticulating is distinctiveness in a 
practical and pragmatic way as possibly the only organisation with genuine potential to become a 
comprehensive security provider. This would, in turn, allow it to provide the ‘added value’ so often 
sought by member states. Second, it creates obstacles. The continuing political tensions, 
machinations, and turf wars within the Brussels bureaucracy and/or between the member states 
undermines the EU’s ability to act comprehensively and to redesign its institutions and capabilities to 
better address the blurring of internal and external security. Third, the European security continuum, 
and the EU’s rhetorical, institutional and technological responses to it, has a more fundamental 
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implication for the EU as an international security provider. As internal and external threats become, 
at least rhetorically, conflated the EU is increasingly framing its role in international security as 
indispensable for protecting the EU, its member states and its citizens. This moves the EU away from 
its normative power self-image with a responsibility to act as a ‘force of good’ in the world. The 
European security continuum might be reorienting the EU towards pursuing Wolfers’ possession 
goals rather than milieu goals.
82
  
 
The European security continuum, therefore, provides an opportunity both practically and 
normatively to carve out a distinctive, comprehensive role for the EU as an international security 
provider. Yet, the obstacles of institutional and capability coordination mean this ambition is still 
some way off being realised and, more profoundly, the notion of the EU’s distinctiveness as a 
normative power focused on ‘milieu goals’ is in danger of being seriously undermined. 
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